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RUEHKM/AMEMBASSY KAMPALA PRIORITY 0267

RUEHKH/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM PRIORITY 0543

RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI PRIORITY 0580

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SUBJECT: UNSC/SUDAN: SOUTH NEEDS AS MUCH ATTENTION AS WEST

REF: SECSTATE 15806

¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY. United Nations (UN) Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) Under-Secretary-General (SYG) Guehenno told the UN Security Council (SC) at February 8 consultations that the international community had a crucial role to play in ensuring full implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in Sudan, particularly in the areas of security, the Abyei issue and elections preparations. Stressing that Sudan peace was indivisible, Guehenno updated on efforts to stabilize Darfur through assistance to the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS), appealing to Members to provide the 44 additional officers required to complete the Light Support Package (LSP). Guehenno said it was the AU which was insisting on a formal response from President Bashir endorsing the Heavy Support Package (HSP) in order to secure troop contributor commitments. On the timeline for overall deployment of assistance to AMIS, Guehenno cautioned that he "did not want to deceive the Council" and stated that, largely due to a lack of firm troop-contributing country (TCC) pledges, it was "unrealistic to think the full package would be in place by June." After consultations, UKUN indicated privately it was considering pushing for a statement from the Council calling for necessary steps to be taken toward full CPA implementation and asked if we could support such a show of Council engagement. END SUMMARY.

INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY KEY IN FULL CPA IMPLEMENTATION

¶2. (SBU) UN DPKO U/SYG Guehenno told the UNSC at February 8 consultations that the international community had a crucial role to play in ensuring full CPA implementation. Parties to the agreement (the National Congress Party (NCP) and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A)) cooperated only in areas of mutual interest, resulting in some modest power- and wealth-sharing advances (like establishment of the new Sudanese currency), but Guehenno complained such contentious questions as human rights and use of natural resources were left unaddressed. Guehenno identified three main areas of concern requiring international attention.

¶3. (SBU) First among these was the security situation between the North and South. Guehenno characterized the recent spate of fighting between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the SPLA in Malakal as the "most serious ceasefire breach since 2002," and attributed it to the parties' failure to integrate armed groups, as well as their failure to establish Joint

Integrated Units (JIUs), which Guehenno called "critical deterrents" to armed militias and other spoilers, as well as credible confidence-building measures between the sides. International assistance was needed to ensure JIU formation, as well as to complete the security protocol; despite assistance from the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) in this regard, the SAF continued to oppose party training. Finally, Guehenno appealed for international support on Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) efforts, which were undermined by the continued existence of armed groups. Guehenno noted that UNMIS had a team currently in the field to study how to move DDR forward but confessed to limited success on this front because the parties had not established the necessary mechanisms called for by the CPA.

¶4. (SBU) The second area of concern Guehenno highlighted was the need to resolve the Abyei boundary issue, which he said has seen no significant progress, especially given the absence of a civilian administrator for over two years. Guehenno raised the possibility that mediation by the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) might be required if the process continued to stall. Demarcation of the North-South border would go far in resolving oil revenue-sharing issues, but Guehenno remarked that as long as the border area remained as highly militarized as it was at present, the potential for violence remained an urgent concern.

¶5. (SBU) Guehenno's third area of concern revolved around elections preparations. Guehenno said that UNMIS is preparing to play a key coordination role for elections. He noted, however, that groundwork to get the census going could not begin because the Government of National Unity (GNU) had

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yet to release the requisite funds (despite the fact that there are only ten months left to meet the census deadline of December 2007). Guehenno said that the parties could use a message of "international solidarity and support" to make unity more attractive to southerners. Guehenno reported that a delegation of the Government of South Sudan visited UNMIS headquarters in Khartoum during the week of February 5 with a message urging a peace dividend for the South. Guehenno accordingly recommended that donors support development programs in the South as a matter of urgency.

¶6. (SBU) Guehenno provided little information on the suspended Juba Peace Talks between the Government of Uganda and the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), despite questions from some Members, including Ambassador Sanders. He mentioned reports of increased banditry in areas where LRA rebels were known to operate but admitted there was no direct proof linking the group to the incidents. The perpetrators of such attacks were difficult to determine. The UK Deputy PermRep announced that HMG would contribute \$500,000 to the UN fund supporting the Juba Talks.

MEMBERS URGE THAT DARFUR NOT DETRACT FROM SOUTH SUDAN . . .

¶7. (SBU) Many Members cautioned that the crisis in Darfur not be allowed to overshadow the crisis in the south of Sudan, urging that a new Special Representative of the SYG be appointed for UNMIS as quickly as possible to ensure that CPA implementation got the full attention it deserved, an appointment Guehenno assured was a top priority for the SYG. Members called for a reinvigoration of the Assessment and Evaluation Commission, for progress with Other Armed Groups, for resolution of the Abyei question and for accelerated elections preparations. The Chinese representative expressed support for UNMIS' work and, in another indication of its recent "aggressive" rhetoric vis-a-vis Sudan, urged greater cooperation from the GNU with UNMIS. The Ghanaian representative voiced support for the pending investigations into allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse by UNMIS personnel, to which Guehenno reiterated the UN's "zero tolerance, zero complacency and zero impunity" policy.

¶8. (SBU) After consultations, UKUN indicated privately it was weighing the issuance of a statement (presumably a Presidential Statement) from the Council calling for necessary steps to be taken toward full CPA implementation and asked if USUN could support such a show of Council engagement. The Belgian Mission also approached Poloff to ask if USUN were planning to draft such a statement.

. . . YET DARFUR DISCUSSIONS INEVITABLE

¶9. (SBU) Stressing that Sudan peace was indivisible, Guehenno updated on efforts to stabilize Darfur through assistance to AMIS. He reported that UN support under the LSP was progressing, with 50 troops and 32 police advisers deployed since December 28, as well as 192 night vision goggles and 36 GPS systems purchased. Guehenno appealed to Members to provide the 44 additional officers required to complete the LSP. He also raised the link between the recruitment of these remaining personnel to the outstanding issue of agreement from the North Darfur Governor to purchase the land necessary to build accommodations for these personnel, as well as for the Governor's permission to study the water table in this area.

¶10. (SBU) Guehenno confirmed that details of the HSP had been finalized by the UN and the AU, but that a response from President Bashir on the package was still pending. In response to a question from the French PermRep, Guehenno said it was the AU which was insisting on a formal response from President Bashir endorsing the HSP in order to secure TCC commitments; Guehenno announced that there would be another TCC meeting for the HSP on February 14. Guehenno added that the international community needed to continue to push the GNU to accept the HSP in order to assure proper procurement of resources. On HSP costs (already projected by the SYG at \$194 million for six months), Guehenno reported that DPKO was going back and forth with the UN Bureau of Management on the financial dimensions of this package but expected the Comptroller to finalize the plan within the next 12 days,

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after which it would be presented to the UNSC for review and for eventual General Assembly endorsement. Ambassador Sanders pressed for swift action by DPKO to finalize these figures and thus eliminate a potential bottleneck to deployment. Guehenno appealed for assistance from partners in convincing a reticent AMIS Force Commander of the merits of not conditioning the restructuring of AMIS from eight to three sectors on the arrival of the requested two additional battalions.

¶11. (SBU) On the timeline for the hybrid mission, Guehenno said the UN and AU were currently completing a rapid re-assessment of the information in the SYG's June 2006 Report on deployment to Darfur and would submit the conclusions of this latest review the week of February 12. Guehenno did not expect the basic findings to differ substantially from the June 2006 Report but noted that issues of command and control arrangements (whose basic structure, according to Guehenno, had to come from DPKO and not the AU), force size, force generation modalities, recruitment of civilian personnel and funding were outstanding. Once management and financing aspects were finalized, a joint concept of operations and an operational plan for deployment could be drafted and submitted first to the GNU for approval, then presented to the UNSC.

¶12. (SBU) Guehenno reminded that AMIS would require logistical and financial support from donors through the end of its mandate but did not mince words on how long a period this would be. In response to numerous concerns raised by Members, Guehenno cautioned that he "did not want to deceive the Council" and stated that, largely due to a lack of firm TCC pledges, it was "unrealistic to think the full package would be in place by June." With no firm TCC commitments, it

was "anyone's guess" as to how long it could take to get the hybrid on the ground, a reality compounded by the fact that, according to Guehenno, for deployment purposes "Darfur is not Lebanon," and the TCCs it would attract would likely not have the same self-sustainment capacities as those of other operations.

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